Glossary of Frequently Used Initials
A-2 — Air Intelligence (Army)
AAF — Army Air Force
AGFRTS — Air Ground Force Resources and Technical Staff (14th Air Force, China, ground
intelligence, an OSS controlled organization; now a part of the OSS Chinkiang Unit, one of the
three OSS commands in China.)
AI — Air Intelligence (British Air Ministry)
BAM — British Air Ministry
BMEW — British Ministry of Economic Warfare
CD — Censorship & Documents Branch (OSS)
CIC — Counter Intelligence Corps (US Army)
CID — Central Information Division (OSS, R&A Branch)
CSDIC — Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center (Allied interrogation service; pooled
DGER — Direcion Generale Des Etudes et Recherches (French counterpart of OSS)
DMI — Division of Military Intelligence (British War Office)
DNI — Division of Naval Intelligence (U.S. - formerly the ONI)
ETO — European Theater of Operations
FCC — Federal Communications Commission
FEA — Foreign Economic Commission
FIC — French Indo-China
FIME — Forces in Middle East (British Army)
FNB — Foreign Nationalities Branch (OSS)
FP — Field Photograph Branch (OSS)
FO — Foreign Office (British)
FORD — Foreign Office Research Branch (British)
Fr-SR — Services de Renseignements et Service de Securite Militaire (French Intelligence &
Security services - now defunct)
Ga2 — U.S. Army Intelligence
HO — Hydrgraphic Office (U.S. Navy)
IB — India-Burma Theater of Operations
IDC — Interdepartmental Committee for Acquisition of Foreign Periodicals (OSS sponsored
committee)
ISLD — Inter-Service Liaison Division (British intelligence)
ISTD — Inter-Service Topographical Division (British topographical intelligence publishing service)
JCS — Joint Chiefs of Staff
JANIS — Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (Army-Navy-OSS joint project for publishing
strategic surveys)
JIC — Joint Intelligence Committee
JICA — Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (American Intelligence pools in the theaters of
operations.)
JISPB — Joint Intelligence Studies Publication Board
JSSC — Joint Strategic Survey Committee
Mil — (Directorate of) Military Intelligence (British War Office); (Section 1 of several sections)
MIS — Military Intelligence Service (U.S. Army; formerly MID)
MO — Morale Operations Branch (OSS)
MOI — Ministry of Information (British)
MTO — Mediterranean Theater of Operations
MU — Maritime Unit (OSS)
NETO — Near East Theater of Operations
NID — Naval Intelligence Dept. (British)
OB — Order of Battle
OG — Operational Groups
OSS — Office of Strategic Services
OMI — Office of War Information
PLOPS — Planning and Operations (Army or OSS)
PWB — Psychological Warfare Branch (AFHQ - Allied Force Headquarters)
PWE — Political Warfare Executive (British)
R&A — Research and Analysis Branch (OSS)
R&D — Research and Development (OSS)
SACO — Sino-American (OSS Chinese joint intelligence project based in Chungking)
SEAC — Southeast Asia Command (Gen. Montbatten's command)
SEATIC — Southeast Asia Technical Intelligence Center
SFE — Survey of Foreign Experts (An OSS sponsored and supported service which interviews area
and technical experts in the United States on request by any authorized government agency)
SI — Secret Intelligence Branch (OSS)
SIGIS — Secret Intelligence Geographic Interpretation Section
SIS — Secret Intelligence Service (British)
SITREP — Situation Report
SO — Special Operations Branch (OSS)
SOE — Special Operations Executive (British, corresponding roughly to OSS-SO)
SSO — Strategic Services Officer (Chief OSS officer for a theater)
S&T — Schools & Training Branch (OSS)
SWP — Southwest Pacific (MacArthur's former command)
VP — Visual Presentation Branch (OSS)
WO — War Office (British)
X-2 — X-2 Branch (OSS counter-intelligence)
OSS Detachments in the Far East:
101 — India-Burma, based on .Assam (India) and advanced points in Burma
202 — China, Kunming
203 — SACO - Chungking
204 — China, S&T Detachment base at Kai Yuan, near Kumring
205 — Chengtu, China
303 — New Delhi, India
404 — Kandy, Ceylon
505 — Calcutta, India
Organization of OSS China Theater
(OSS Detachment-202)
This chart presents the OSS organization in China based in Kunming (the major base for OSS
operations) and in Chungking (residence of the Strategic Services Officer for China.) The SS
Officer is directly responsible to the American commanding general for the theater and to the
Director of OSS, Washington.
The China OSS organization (like OSS in most theaters) has many similarities to the OSS
Washington organization. All the Branches are represented, and in many instances their personnel
share common quarters and offices. The Operations Planning Board bears the same relationship to
OSS China as the Planning Group and Planning Staff bear to OSS Washington. Just as it was
found impractical by experience to direct operations entirely from the United States, it has been
found impractical to plan and coordinate operations from a distance.
The OSS China organization has been split into three distinct geographic commands (not shown in
this chart), each one of which is a replica on a small scale of the base organization which is shown
in the chart. Each of the three sub-areas are commanded by separate OSS officers, and all the
Branches are represented on their staffs. The three areas administered from three sub-bases cover
(a) North China down to, approximately, the Yellow River, (b) Central China including the coastal
regions down to, approximately, the Indo-China border, and (c) Indo-China and contiguous regions
in South China. The OSS officers commanding these three areas are directly responsible to the SS
Officer, China Theater. This arrangement gives considerable flexibility to OSS operations in China
in a rapidly expanding strategic situation. Two features of OSS China deserve special mention.
The SACO unit is a Chinese-American joint intelligence effort staffed with Chinese and Americans
for the mutual exploitation of certain intelligence channels. The SACO unit is based on Chungking,
benefits from intelligence chains already established by the Chinese, and organizes other chains.
The Chinese side consists of representatives of General Tai Lits Nationalist organization called the
Bureau of Intelligence and Statistics, which has both intelligence and police functions. The
American side consists of a U.S. Navy group and an OSS group, both working under General Tai Li.
The AGFRTS Unit was formed as a joint OSS-14th Air Force organization under the command of
General Chennault. It furnished weather, ground, and ship target intelligence through intelligence
networks in Southeast China: it rendered bomb damage assessment reports; and it set up
machinery for the rescue of U.S. Air Force pilots brought down in guerrilla held "Jap-occupied"
areas. In early 1945 AGFRTS was transferred from the 14th Air Force command to direct OSS
control under the OSS Strategic Services Officer and the U.S. China Theater Commander. As a
result, its intelligence activities were broadened and its intelligence product made available to a
wider circle of "customers." The unit is no longer known as AGFRTS, and it is an integral part of the
central sub-area of OSS/China in which it operates.
The activities of OSS China are expanding rapidly as the strategic picture in that theater unfolds.
Because of the fluid "lines" throughout China there are almost limitless opportunities for effectively
organizing and supplying resistance behind the Japanese. The training and equipping of Chinese
OG units, the extension of intelligence chains, and the morale subversion of the enemy present
OSS with perhaps its best opportunity for large-scale operations, particularly since the American
Army is so far not engaged there in any important numbers. With the lessons learned in Europe,
and at Detachment 101, OSS in China will be able to coordinate all its weapons against the enemy
as never before and will operate through the air, on water, and on land. Unprecedented demands
will be made upon the OSS Branches offering supporting services to the intelligence and
operational Branches: supply, transport, services, training, communications, and medical. As seen
in the preceding chart (Intelligence and Operations - FETO), the scope of the OSS effort in China is
already impressive.
Intelligence & Operations- FETO
India- Burma Theater
Detachment 101 – Bhamo
Operational Strength- 566 Americans, 9,200 Kachin Rangers
Operations- Guides and security patrols for Merrill's Marauders, Mars Task Force, British and
Chinese Forces. Evacuated 470 allied wounded, 288 U.S. airmen. 85% of intelligence for north
Burma campaign, 76% of 10 Air Force targets, 100% of ground damage assessment. Killed 4,230,
captured 53 Japanese. Identified 922 Japanese agents. Leaflets, tumors, and radio beginning to
change Japanese surrender policy. 4,000 tons arms and supplies by air.
Detachment 202 - Ceylon
Operational Strength- 59 Americans, many native sub-agents
Operations- Detailed intelligence on southern Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and Sumatra. Brought out
Thai official to confer with State Department. Location of POW camps. Assessment of air raids,
selection of air targets.
China Theater
Operational Strength- 185 Americans, 5,000 Chinese authorized
Operations- Organizing and training 20 Chinese commando groups. Destroyed 17 bridges, 3
tunnels, 19 ferries, 1 airdrome. Agents supplied 57% of ground intelligence to 14th Air Force,
resulting in destruction of 9,000 Japanese cavalry. AGFRTS, SACO, and other OSS sources
supplied a third of all ground intelligence received by G-2 in theater. Identified 535 enemy agents.
OSS Organization
OSS is divided into a number of Branches, each Branch being responsible for a particular function.
In the theaters of operations, Branch representatives are often called upon to assist in performing
the functions of other Branches, and the functions of all are closely coordinated by local and
theater commanding officers.
The two large OSS functions (Intelligence Services, and Strategic Services Operations) are
administered by two deputy directors. Under each deputy director are the several Branches which
carry out particular parts of those larger functions for which he is responsible.
Intelligence Operations
The SI (Secret Intelligence) Branch is responsible for obtaining secret intelligence by means of
espionage throughout the world, except in Latin-America, and by liaison with other Allied intelligence
agencies engaged in espionage. It recruits agents, sets up chains of intelligence in neutral and
enemy-occupied territory, and exploits existing sources for clandestine intelligence such as
underground and guerrilla groups, and Allied secret intelligence sources. SI deals largely in spot
intelligence reports (called SI disseminations).
The X-2 Branch is responsible for counterespionage abroad as well as some security functions in
connection with our missions in the active theaters. The Branch's spot intelligence products are
used largely in support of the Army’s CIC, and the Branch works closely with the FBI.
The R&A (Research and Analysis) Branch is a research branch which coordinates intelligence
from all sources and produces finished intelligence studies of a strategic, political, geographical,
and economic nature. R&A's published contributions to the war effort have been numerous and
important.
FNB (Foreign Nationalities Branch) has domestic functions within the United States. It studies
constantly the political temperature of the various nationality groups in this country in relation to
political events abroad, and publishes timely reports.
The CD (Censorship and Documents) Branch has dual functions: (a) the securing of censorship
materials for the organization, and special monitoring of enemy broadcasts for commercial and
economic intelligence as well as political intelligence; and (b) research in, and supply of personal
documents required for undercover operations by other Branches.
Strategic Services Operations
The SO (Special Operations) Branch organizes and/or supplies sabotage operations behind the
enemy’s lines. It furnished agents and communications and supplies to underground and guerrilla
groups in Norway, France, Denmark, northern Italy, China, etc., the enemy's lines for the
destruction of specific targets, for securing intelligence, and waging guerrilla warfare.
The MO (Morale Operations) Branch is responsible for subversion of the enemy's morale, at home
and at the front. Its techniques are called "Black" propaganda; that is, propaganda which purports
to come from a source other than the stated one. Its weapons are — "black" radio, leaflets, rumors,
poison pen letters, and a variety of "black" newspapers and other publications.
MU (the Maritime Unit) was organized to carry out sabotage against enemy shipping by use of
such means as underwater demolitions and stealthy forays into enemy harbors. The contribution of
this unit has been most important in the field of water transport for agent infiltrations and the supply
of agents and underground groups.
The Special Projects Branch is organized to carry out missions of a specialized nature that do not
fall in the jurisdiction of any other branch of SSO.
The Field Experimental Unit is a special operational group included in the SSO division for
administration. Planning and Operations of this group, however, is done under direct control from
the Director's Office.
The OG (Operational Group) Command organizes and operates guerrilla forces in deep
penetration operations. In China, and in other places, it has trained and officered guerrilla bands
recruited abroad. In France just prior to and immediately after D-day, the OG Command dropped
groups for liaison and support to the Maquis.
Other Branches of the OSS
All other parts of the OSS organization serve it in either an administrative or a supporting and
supplementary manner.
The S&T (Schools and Training) Branch trains OSS personnel both in the United States and in the
several active theaters. This Branch is also responsible for the preliminary screening of recruits for
service overseas by means of a psychological assessment program.
The Planning Group is the top planning and advisory group to the Director (Major General William
Donovan), and it consists of about half a dozen men, two of whom are representatives of the Army
and Navy on the highest echelon. The Planning Staff performs research and technical services in
support of the Planning Group's program proposals.
The Registry of the Secretariat registers and stores the periodic OSS mission reports and other
reports from the field. The Reports Office (not to be confused with the Reporting Board, which is a
part of.the SI Branch) is an editorial and routing office for such reports.
The Communications Branch operates an independent OSS communications system with
practically world coverage so that the missions abroad not only have direct radio communications
with OSS Washington but with sub-bases and agents in the field. It is responsible for initiating OSS
cipher and code systems used in OSS communications. The Branch also supplies base radio
operators for field teams and radio equipment for those teams. (OSS utilizes Army and State Dept.
pouch facilities for transmission to Washington of written reports, however, and also State
Department cable facilities from some neutral countries.)
The Field Photographic Branch is the motion picture production and picture taking Branch which
records OSS activities in the States and abroad. It produces OSS training films. And it has
performed strategic photographic missions for OSS, the Army, and the Navy overseas. Personnel
of Field Photo accompanied the OSS City Teams which were dispatched quickly to newly liberated
European cities.
The VP (Visual Presentation) Branch employs artists and designers. Its function is to present
pictorially and in chart form all OSS activities. It is also the procurer of motion picture films produced
outside the organization, and it has done such other jobs as the preparation of special training aids
for the S&T Branch.
The R&D (Research & Development) Branch acquires, develops, and supplies special, sabotage
and other devices for use in field operations such as: camouflaged devices for carrying concealed
messages; various explosive devices and weapons.
The Hq and Hq Detachment, and the Naval Command perform the usual headquarters functions for
Army and Navy personnel assigned to OSS. The Naval Command is also the liaison and funnel for
all DNI intelligence coming into OSS, but there are special Intelligence Liaison Officers for liaison
with MIS, G-2, and the JICAts.
The Security Branch checks the security of all personnel before recruitment and is responsible for
the physical security of OSS establishments in the United State; and abroad.
The Special Funds Branch 'disburses "unvouchered" funds made available by Congress for which
the organization is not accountable in detail, for obvious security reasons. This Branch is also
responsible for the acquisition of the necessary foreign exchange in the field in support of
undercover operations.
The Chief Surgeon is head of the OSS medical units here and abroad. This organization is
responsible for the health of OSS personnel, and maintains small but well equipped hospitals at
bases for treatment of illness and casualties. Officers of this Branch have also contributed to, and
helped to evaluate, our fund of medical intelligence from enemy and enemy-occupied territory.
All the other Branches and divisions identified on the chart perform functions which their names
imply.
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) is an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with
collecting and analyzing strategic information and secret intelligence required for military
operations, and with planning and executing programs of physical sabotage and morale subversion
against the enemy to support military operations.
The OSS is dynamic. It is constantly changing organizationally and in scope of activity. It is in a
continual state of adaptation to the needs of the war in United States and to peculiar conditions in
the various theaters of operations.
T/Sgt Robert Bursian, Regular Member Mark Bursian (son), Associate Member
|
Welcome to Night Gang's OSS-Detachment 101
site. This section is a tribute to the men of this
unit, to honor and share their history and untold
contributions to the Allied cause in the
China-Burma-India theater.
What is the OSS?
Excerpts from Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Organization and Functions, Schools and Training Branch, June 1945 (Declassified).
This simple chart explains the lines of responsibility and authority connecting the OSS with the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff..


SI Branch
This chart of SI Branch organization in Washington is largely self-explanatory, but the following
comments might be in order.
The various-geographic Divisions and Sections are responsible for supporting activities in the
theaters of operation with which they are concerned. They are responsible for seeing to it that
adequate personnel are recruited, trained and dispatched overseas, that the needs and requests of
the SI representatives abroad are met, that secret intelligence activities in the various theaters are
coordinated and given over-all policy direction, that SI activities in Washington and abroad are
coordinated with those of other Branches of OSS, and that secret intelligence reports from OSS
organizations and representatives overseas are brought to Washington, processed and distributed
to "customers" within OSS and throughout the U.S. Government.
In addition various "staff" Sections, such as the Technical Section and the Labor Section, are
responsible for carrying out special functions within the various theaters of operation. The Labor
Section, for example, is charged with establishing contact with organized underground labor groups
abroad for intelligence and subversive activities.
Dissemination of all SI reports is made through the Reporting Board, to which all reports go for final
editing and evaluation after being processed by the geographic Section concerned.
In each of the principal theaters of military operations there are similar organizations, charged with
the responsibility of obtaining secret intelligence from original sources and Allied secret intelligence
agencies, and supplying these reports promptly to authorized "customers" in the theater before
sending them to Washington.
Coordination between the four main geographic divisions of SI is necessary because of the global
nature of intelligence. For example, considerable technical and political intelligence concerning
Japan was found in newly liberated regions of Europe, and personnel of the SI European Division
exploited these sources for the benefit of the SI Far East Division.
While the SI organization in each theater heads up into the OSS HQ for the theater, SI subbases
and representatives are inevitably spread throughout the theater, SI agents in turn extending out
from these. Networks of SI agents in North Africa and Europe furnished many reports, military,
political, economic and psychological, both before and after the respective D-Days. The story of
their preparation for the invasion of North Africa, for example, is now well known. As another
example, according to official 7th Army statement, SI agents furnished 50-60% of all ground
intelligence used in the Allied invasion into southern France and the drive northward to Germany.
While before D-Day secret intelligence was, obtained by means of individual agents introduced by
clandestine means from Allied bases into enemy held territory, after D-Day SI men were attached to
the advancing Armies on corps and divisional levels for tactical intelligence operations in France
and Germany, and these tactical detachments briefed and dispatched agents recruited on the spot
for shallow penetrations of the enemy lines as the fronts advanced.
During the post-hostilities period in Europe, SI has been entrusted with various intelligence
assignments connected with the occupation of Germany and Austria. Bases abroad, and
techniques of operations, are being changed to meet the new conditions.
In the Far Eastern theaters, SI has virtually completed its coverage of the India-Burma theater, and
is being called on in the China theater for constantly widening coverage. The target area, (Japan
and the so-called Inner Zone), presents a problem even more difficult than that in Europe, and one
which will test to the full the resources and skill of the SI Branch.

R & A Branch
The R&A Branch draws upon all available sources for secret intelligence and for regularly
published information. It analyzes, correlates, and interprets this mass of material and produces
finished intelligence studies. In Washington, the R&A Branch is the OSS central repository for all
incoming intelligence from whatever source: MIS, DNI, our Allies, other government agencies, other
OSS Branches.
The Branch produces a steady stream of intelligence studies on almost any country or topic upon
demand of the Army or Navy or other authorized agency or Branch of OSS. The R&A Branch
produces weekly situation reports covering the world politically and economically. Some of the
Branchs most important contributions have been Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies published
under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Civil Affairs Handbooks and Guides
published by the Army and Navy.
The five special staffs of representatives in the top row of boxes in the chart, perform liaison and
coordinating functions as between R&A and other government agencies and the Army and Navy.
The special assistant for Civil Affairs is necessary because of the size and importance of the R&A
job of producing Civil Affairs Guides and Handbooks.
The Projects Committee must authorize and approve all study and research projects of the R&A
Branch. Upon approval, studies and other publications are turned over to the Branch Editor who
edits them, sees to their publication and distribution to authorized "customers".
There are four main geographical Divisions, within R&A:- the Europe-Africa Division, the Far East
Division, the Latin America Division, and the USSR Division. These divisions are responsible for
the analysis of all intelligence on the geographic areas to which they are assigned. (A detailed chart
and text on one of these divisions, the Far East Division, follows.)
The Current Intelligence Staff maintains a War Room for the top executives of the OSS. It also
produces the Current Intelligence Studies, which are sometimes abbreviated R&A studies, and it
produces a daily situation report for use in the War Room.
The Map Division has one of the most complete collections of maps - on microfilm as well as on
paper -- in the world. It collects maps from all sources through regular OSS intelligence channels as
well as from the Navy, the Army Map Service, the State Department, and other government
sources. The Map Division maintains a cartographic section for the drawing and publishing of
special OSS maps to be used in OSS intelligence studies, and it produces relief models which are
used by Army and Navy for strategic planning as well as by the Army Service Forces for its weekly
and widely circulated Newsmap. It supplies maps in large quantities for use by OSS personnel and
for the Armed Forces.
The Central Information Division is the library division, the repository for intelligence documents
from all sources including other OSS Branches. This Division is complex organizationally and
functionally. In addition to maintaining an extensive library for OSS, this Division also collects and
catalogues photographs of a strategic nature, maintains an extensive card index on foreign
personalities, and receives and makes available documents from a wide variety of sources
including MIS, DNI, Department of State, Allied governments, other OSS Branches, Office of
Censorship, Justice Department, Treasury Department, etc., etc. Documentary materials are
carefully catalogued and indexed for research purposes
The Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Periodicals has the function of
collecting, in the original and on microfilm, copies of all sorts of foreign newspapers., periodicals,
books, technical and trade magazines, etc. This committee, although OSS financed and sponsored,
serves all the United States Government war agencies with desired foreign publications.
R&A, like the other Branches, is represented in the OSS missions overseas. The Branches
specialized efforts are brought to bear directly on intelligence problems in the particular theaters,
and R&A men have performed a variety of jobs in the field. In Italy, R&A representatives not only
performed almost on a diplomatic level in reporting political and military intelligence in the liberated
regions, but they interrogated prisoners for enemy economic intelligence, prepared air target
studies in collaboration with the Air Forces, and helped to direct the efforts of other Branches in
obtaining useful and needed intelligence. R&A representatives were in the first parties to arrive in
liberated Balkan capitals and large central European cities in order to assist in quickly obtaining
important intelligence materials left behind by the enemy. In Burma, R&A men helped to brief SI
native intelligence agents. R&A Branch maintained a large staff in ETO to render strategic
intelligence services to the Army and Air Forces there, and representatives of the Branch have
moved to the Continent with OSS missions.

R & A Branch, Far East Division
The Far East Division, organizationally, is typical of the four other R&A Geographical Divisions,
except that it maintains a separate library of Far Eastern books and publications apart from the
main OSS library which is a part of the Central Information Division.
There are three principal Washington sub-divisions responsible for Far East intelligence in the
fields of (a) geography and topography, (b) politics, and (c) economics. The production of a
strategic survey on a Far Eastern country would involve the joint efforts of these three
sub-divisions. The Geographic Sub-division would contribute information on the topography of the
country, the rail, telegraphic, telephone, and road communications, the weather, ports, airfields,
cities, etc. The Political Sub-division would contribute the sections of the survey dealing with the
political structure and the current political situation within the country. And the Economic
Sub-division would contribute the sections of the survey dealing with military supplies, food,
industry, raw material supplies, production potentials, location of industries, etc.
The sub-division distinctions apply to R&A, Far East Division, in Washington. They tend to
disappear in the Division's organization in the Far East theaters of operations where
representatives of the Division must be versatile in all intelligence aspects of the countries for
which they are responsible.

SO Branch
The SO Branch operates behind enemy lines and from bases in Allied or neutral countries. The
chief functions are: (1) sabotage, (2) organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare, (3) contact and
support of underground resistance groups, (4) special operations not assigned to any other
Government agency.
Prior to D-Day, SO had installations in ETO for training agents and Jedburgh personnel and
supplying resistance groups. They also materially aided the rescue of downed Allied fliers. These
operations continued after D-Day in addition to dropping Jedburgh teams into all parts of France
where they directed Partisan resistance in harassing the German Army. The outstanding
achievement was the holding of the 3rd Army's right flank during the breakthrough from St. Lo.
Joint SO/SOE schools trained 500 Norwegian nationals who re-entered their country to receive air
drops of supplies and lead sabotage activities.
In the Mediterranean Theater SO dropped huge quantities of supplies to Partisans in Italy, acted as
liaison with Balkan resistance forces, and directed teams in physical subversion. An example of
their effectiveness in Greece was the cutting of the main railroad route between Turkey and
Greece for a considerable period of time by blowing several bridges. SO Branch also evacuated
more than 3,000 downed airmen.
The outstanding achievement of OSS in the Far East was clearing the Japs out of northern Burma.
This was done by Detachment 101 which had been established by SO personnel with
headquarters in Assam. SO men parachuted into enemy-held territory and trained and led the
Kachin Rangers (native troops) in many successful operations against Japanese installations. The
capture of the Myitkyina airfield (bomber and fighter base) was facilitated by SO and SO-trained
personnel.
In China, the SO Branch has perhaps its most favorable opportunity for extensive operations. In
connection with U.S. Army offensives in China, SO has great strategic value. One of the most
effective operations has been the sabotage of enemy communications and supply lines by
demolition teams with the aid of Chinese guerrillas.
The SO Branch has contributed directly to the war effort by planning, organizing and executing
harassing operations and direct sabotage at crucial points. By assisting conquered peoples to
liberate their countries, Special Operations has proven its value in the Allied Cause.

OG Branch
Operational Groups have a dual function, (a) they serve as the operational nuclei of guerrilla
organizations which have been formed from resistance groups in enemy territory, (b) they execute
independent operations against enemy targets on orders of the theater commander.
OG works with individuals unfamiliar with military operations as well as insufficiently-equipped
quasi-military organizations. The former are organized and trained in military techniques of
resistance. The latter are provided with supplies and their tactics are coordinated with allied military
plans. Leadership is normally kept in the hands of the native people, though OG may select leaders
and unify opposing groups.
The aim of CG activity is to aid actual and planned Allied military operations by harassing the
enemy behind his lines, by disrupting his lines of communication and supply, and by forcing him to
divert troops to protect himself from guerrilla attacks and wide-scale uprisings.
The activities, mode of operation, and personnel of OG differ from those of the Special Operations
Branch. OG personnel activate guerrillas as military organizations to engage enemy forces. They
always operate in uniform as military units and are not primarily concerned with individual acts of
sabotage.

MO Branch
The Plans Sections originate weekly, strategic intelligence directives and summaries for dispatch to
the field, suggesting their adaption to field operations. The Plans Officers, in liaison with the OSS
Planning Staff, insure that MO activities conform to approved OSS policies as directed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, State Department, etc.
The Production Officers expedite the physical production of material for the campaigns and
projects prepared by Desk Officers.
MO Definitions
By Joint Chiefs of Staff directive, MO Branch is charged with "Planning and executing programs of
morale subversion against the enemy in support of military operations."
The Morale Operations Branch deals with that phase of propaganda known as black or covert. It
comes from a hidden source, is unofficial and purports to be disseminated from within the target
country by persons who claim to be serving its interests.
MO black propaganda coaxes the minds of those it wishes to manipulate with the confidential voice
of an accepted friend. As such, it can be far more effective than the direct appeals or the stern
comamands, threats or promises of a stranger.
The Mission of MO
Since MO, according to OSS General Order No. 9, "is responsible for the conduct of subversion
other than physical", its mission is to create internal dissension between groups, distrust between
allies, and to unify and strengthen dissident groups so that the enemy's fighting capacity is impaired.
1. Objective - WITHIN THE ENEMY STATE, MO seeks to deepen and enlarge the differences
among enemy groups and peoples by creating resentment, friction, and civil strife among them.
2. Objective - AMONG ENEMY ALLIES, MO seeks to divide the coalition of enemy states by
creating mutual distrust and suspicion. National differences are played up, antagonisms and
rivalries are brought out and exaggerated, and suspicion is thrown on the faith and integrity of the
enemy’s allies.
MO Media and Techniques
Printed Material - (Leaflets, Posters, Stickers, Stencils, Newspapers and Magazine Articles).
Disguised as official enemy publications; or as organs of actual or fake dissident groups in enemy
nations; or of resistance groups in enemy-occupied countries.

Black Radio Campaigns - Posing as "freedom stations" of a resistance group within an
enemy-occupied country; or as clandestine organ of dissident group in enemy country; or as actual
enemy station.
Word-of-Mouth Rumors - Planted by agents in an appropriate situation, and sufficiently plausible
to retain their credibility.
Forgeries - (Commercial Documents, Military Documents, Business Stationery) - Used to
intimidate collaborationists, implicate enemy officials, and harass the enemy's secret police.
Poison Pen Letters - Disguised as letters from actual business firms, soldiers, or other individuals,
and containing incriminating information.
Bribery - Inducing enemy officials to perform acts favorable to our cause.
Operational Ruses - False military orders, manifestos, and demoralizing rumors disseminated
behind enemy front lines to induce surrender or tactical withdrawal.

Maritime Units
Middle East
Extensive and highly successful clandestine ferrying operations were carried out in the Aegean Sea.
OSS personnel and supplies were transported to Greece in support of native resistance groups
and guerrilla forces. A fleet of caiques (native fishing boats) plied between Cyprus and secret
bases in Turkey. From these bases smaller craft took over making pinpoint landings at night on the
Greek coast. In addition to landing agents and keeping them supplied, this ferry service evacuated
many refugees and downed flyers, rescued and brought to evacuation points by Greek guerrillas.
Italy
MU planned and supervised the operations of the San Marco Battalion, an amphibious group of
the Italian Navy. This group was trained in the methods of sneak attack and marine sabotage. They
operated on the coast of the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic seas. They have a long record of successful
missions involving demolition attacks on shore installations within striking distance of the coast.
United Kingdom
Maritime Branch in conjunction with U.S. Navy operated PT boats from British bases to the
continent. It also secured for the British for ultimate use by Allied forces, sub-chasers which were
making successful runs in the North Sea.
IB/SEAC
In this theater Maritime handles the water transportation for all other OSS branches. In this
conjunction, personnel and equipment were ferried up and down the Burma coast from Akyab to
Ramree. Maritime swimmers went in and made reconnaissance determining beach and shore
installations before the British Army forces landed. Other Maritime personnel were actively engaged
on submarines as escorting officers. As such, they landed Military and native personnel and
supplies and equipment behind enemy lines.
Organization of OSS in the Far East and the India-Burma Theater
There are two Strategic Services Officers in the Far East -- one for the India-Burma Theater, and
one for the China Theater.
The SS Officer for I-B is responsible for OSS activities in Southeast Asia and in the
India-Burma-Thailand area. His main base is in Kandy, Ceylon, and there are important sub-bases
at Calcutta and New Delhi, India.
The nearly-autonomous unit known as OSS Detachment-101 also comes under the SS Office for
I-B. This Detachment's job in Burma has come to an end, and its personnel is being absorbed in
other areas- chiefly in the China Theater. This Detachment was the earliest OSS Unit in the Far
East, having been established in late 1942 in upper Assam, India, for intelligence, guerrilla, and
sabotage work behind the Japanese in Northern Burma along the path which General Stilwell's
forces had to take to clear the land supply route 'to China. 101 organized, directed, equipped, and
trained several thousand natives of Burma for guerrilla operations; operated a small air group for
supply and liaison with field groups behind the Japs; set up machinery which worked very efficiently
for the rescue of downed Allied fliers. (See accompanying chart). This Detachment was established
by the SO Branch, and it became one of the most successful OSS enterprises. It has stood as an
example not only of adaptability to peculiar conditions, but also of inter-Branch cooperation
and united Branch operations in the direction of a common goal.
OSS forces in SEAC, under the same SS Officer for I-B, are responsible for operations in the rest
of Burma, Malaya, Thailand, and Sumatra. It is known as OSS Detachment 404. Due to a slower
start, to the nature of the over-all strategic picture, and to the vast water transport problem, the task
of this Detachment has been much more difficult than the task of most OSS organizations overseas.
Its operations in Thailand have been brilliantly successful.
A chart of OSS/I-B organization is not included here. The organization is rather complicated
because of its scattered character with bases in India, Ceylon, and Burma. But the following chart
and text describing OSS organization in China is fairly typical of OSS organization in the Far East
and will give some idea of the I-B setup.



Communications Network - FETO
This chart gives some idea of OSS communications coverage in the Far East where vast distances
separate points which must be joined quickly via radio. Navy and Army trunk communications
channels are used where possible, but most of the coverage, especially with the innumerable field
teams and sub-bases, must be maintained by OSS itself.
The Communications Branch maintains these lines of communication, staffs the stations, furnishes
operators for field missions, and supplies equipment. This Branch does not handle pouch
communication; existing Army or State Department pouch facilities are used by OSS. But the
Communications Branch has used pigeons with good results in Burma, and it has instituted the
OSS system of cipher for radio messages.